The Supreme Court decided in O'Connor v. Donaldson that mentally ill people who were not dangerous and who could survive safely in the community could not be kept in a mental hospital against their will. In 1976, a project evaluated the legality of the commitments of 107 patients in a State mental hospital. The review was conducted by three panels, each composed of a law student, a resident psychiatrist, and a social worker. Evaluations of a patient's dangerousness were made on the basis of information from the patient's hospital records, an interview with the patient's primary therapist at the hospital, and interviews with the patient. Analysis of project recommendations revealed that commitment decisions were more related to the clinical outlook of the evaluators than to the patient's behavior.
In 1975, the Supreme Court announced its decision in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, which held that a person may not be confined to a mental hospital against his will if he is not dangerous to himself or others and is capable of surviving safely in the community. The Court rejected the view that a valid commitment could be predicated on mental illness or treatment alone.
By finding that the case did not require them to decide whether "mentally ill persons dangerous to themselves or to others have a right to treatment upon compulsory confinement by the state, or whether the state may compulsorily confine a nondangerous, mentally ill individual for the purpose of treatment" (422 'Reprint requests should be sent to Ms. Kress at 1020 Fifth Ave., New York, NY 10028.
U.S. at 573), the Court overturned the appellate court's decision in an earlier review of the case that a person confined against his will at a State mental hospital has a "constitutional right to receive such individual treatment as will give him a reasonable opportunity to be cured or to improve his mental condition" (O'Connor v. Donaldson, 493 F.2d 507,  520 [Sth Cir. 1974] ). The Supreme Court decided in Donaldson's favor solely because he was not dangerous and could live safely in the community. The decision thus made evaluations of dangerousness crucial to the commitment and continued confinement of the mentally ill.
Two issues that raise questions about the constitutionality of dangerousness as a standard for confinement are the vagueness of the danger mandate and the difficulty of predicting dangerous behavior. The Supreme Court did not specify when a finding of dangerousness is justified and some State laws are so broad that the concept has been construed to include check-bouncers 1 and people of low IQ.
2 Even if dangerousness is limited and refers, for instance, only to serious aggression toward others, difficulties in predicting dangerous behavior among the mentally ill are complicated by a low incidence of violence in the population, and in the acts of even its most violent members. It is more difficult to select individuals with a particular characteristic if they make up a small, rather than a large, proportion of the population, and more difficult to discriminate between individuals on the basis of acts that may occur only once in a lifetime than acts that occur frequently. Further,
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The common practice of judicial reliance on psychiatric opinion has informally shifted the responsibility for commitments based on dangerousness from the courts to the psychiatric profession. However, the finding of dangerousness for commitment purposes is essentially a legal problem that balances the individual's right to liberty against society's right to protect itself. Research (Scheff 1964) has shown that courts often ask for and respect conelusory statements by psychiatrists about dangerousness, assuming that such statements are made on the basis of professional knowledge. These psychiatric opinions, however, are not matters of clinical expertise; they are, like anyone else's opinion about dangerousness, founded on assumptions about liberty and ideas about the kind of behavior society can tolerate.
Examination of the process of deciding about an individual's dangerousness reveals the social decisions that must be made:
• Unless instructed by law, evaluators must decide whether a person can be preventatively detained for danger to property and self, or whether such extreme measures should be reserved for danger to others: Can a woman with peculiar smoking habits in which she occasionally burns her bed and clothing be locked in a hospital for years against her will because she might accidentally kill herself?
• Even if dangerousness refers only to acts directed at other people, it is often not simple to decide whether a particular act is dangerous to others: Can a man who is susceptible to violent attacks in which he damages his home and property be considered dangerous to those with whom he lives, or is he protected from civil commitment because his actions are not directed against persons?
• Evaluators must decide what kinds of provocative insane behavior can be tolerated in society: Should someone who has shouted threats and obscenities for years, but has never hurt anyone, be committed for the sake of the convenience of the community?
• Since predictions about future behavior are never completely reliable, evaluators must decide on a level of predictive certainty that warrants deprivation of liberty: Can a single, but severe, violent action be considered sufficiently predictive of future violence, or must the actions be habitual?
These questions, and others, which psychiatrists answer for themselves when advising courts about an individual's dangerousness, are not properly the province of psychiatry and should be addressed by society through the legislature.
Even if psychiatrists are barred from giving conclusory opinions about dangerousness and are limited to specific predictions that are not dependent on their social views, courts should hesitate to award them the status of expert witness because surveys of psychiatric predictions have cast considerable doubt on the ability of clinicians to predict future behavior accurately (Gough 1962; Ennis and Latwick 1974; Rappeport 1967) . A noted forensic psychiatrist concluded that it is impossible to make a prediction about someone's future violent behavior that will approach even the lowest legal standard, i.e., a preponderance of the evidence, or SI percent (Stone 1975) .
Despite these problems, and because of the Donaldson decision, a growing civil libertarian view is that commitment must be based only on proof of dangerousness. However, there are the gravest constitutional problems with a civil commitment system in which people are deprived of liberty on the basis of predictions of dangerousness that cannot approach even 50 percent validity.
The Mental Hospital Project
A project designed to implement the Donaldson decision, conducted in 1976, reviewed the legality of the commitments of 107 patients involuntarily held at a Connecticut State mental hospital.
The review was conducted by three panels, each composed of a law student, a resident psychiatrist, and . a social worker. Evaluations of a patient's ability to survive outside the hospital and of his dangerousness were made on the basis of a review of the patient's hospital records, an interview with the patient's primary therapist at the hospital, and interviews with the patient. Following the review, panels made recommendations to the hospital about release, alternative placement (e.g., to nursing homes), and continued commitment.
The composition of the panels and the design of the project were intended to produce consistent clinical evaluations and to ensure that legal standards for commitment were properly applied. In the absence of specific. Court-announced criteria for the determination of dangerousness, project members attempted a definition of dangerousness in terms of recent overt aggressive acts and their relation to present mental condition. However, no objective tests were devised, and judgments about dangerousness tended to be made differently by the different panels. In their report to the sponsoring foundation, the project directors described the disagreements between panel members over the definition of what constitutes dangerousness:
Is an individual who committed a violent act many years ago while suffering from a severe mental condition, which persists to the present, "dangerous," even though there have been no violent episodes in the intervening period? Is a patient to be considered dangerous by the panels if it is clear that he was not dangerous at the time of admission but was later engaged in assaultive acts while hospitalized? What should be made of the patient with a long history of threats but no actual harmful conduct? Finally, should a patient's delusions of persecution and the potential for a defensive response be an adequate base for a determination of dangerousness? [Wizner et al. 1977, p. 24] .
The wide variation in findings of dangerousness among the panels parallels differences in the views of the panel members on the subject. The psychiatrist of panel I held a sociological view of mental illness and would not consider a person dangerous and recommend continued commitment without a showing of serious recent overt acts of aggression.
3 Such also was the view
The project directors characterized the members of panel I as follows:
Members of panel I were reluctant to find a patient dangerous to others without specific evidence of recent overt acts. Moreover, such an act would be discounted if it appeared to be a result of the patient's nospitalization. Panel I seemed to be more inclined to follow a legal model in applying the Donaldson criteria. Thus, a patient who had committed a violent crime many years ago but had exhibited no violent behavior since, or a patient who had committed minor assaults in the hospital but had no record of such behavior outside, was not likely to be found dangerous to others by this panel. [Wizner et al. 1977 , p. 13.1 of the law students of all three panels. On the other hand, the psychiatrist of panel II viewed mental illness as an organic physiological condition and dangerousness as a concomitant of psychosis. Although the law student disagreed with the psychiatrist's views, panel II found more people dangerous than the other panels. On panel HI, the psychiatrist held a moderate view that relied neither on evidence of aggression nor on a presumption of dangerousness.
4 Tables 1 and 2 summarize the recommendations about commitment and the distribution of male and female patients between panels II and III was unequal, a chi-square analysis of the distribution of patient's sex, status, and diagnosis showed no significant differences (p = .065 for sex, and p > .5 for status and diagnosis).
Analysis of Recommendations
In order to determine the relationship between findings of dangerousness and the patient's aggressive behavior, incidents of aggression to others, property, and self for each Table 5 shows that 51 of the 107 patients showed no evidence of aggressive acts, and only 18 of the patients had been aggressive within the 2 most recent years of hospitalization. The low incidence for aggressive behavior reflects the chronicity and institutionalization of a patient population whose mean length of hospitalization is 20 years, in which 56 percent are diagnosed as chronic schizophrenic, and 52 percent of whom are living on open wards or are on extended visits from the hospital. The high incidence of reported aggression to others (47 of the 69 aggressive patients were aggressive toward others) may reflect a bias in staff reporting rather than the actual pattern of aggression among the patients.
A chi-square analysis of aggressive incidents grouped by panel did not reveal significant differences in the level of aggressivity of the patients evaluated by the different panels (p> .5; see table 5). However, a chi-square analysis of the criteria used for recommending continued commitment was significant (p = .031; see table 2). Inspection of the chart on aggressive behavior (table  5) shows that panels I and III each reviewed five patients, and panel II, six patients, whose recent aggression was directed at others. Panel I found •two of the five dangerous, panel III found four of the five dangerous, and panel II found 10 patients dangerous (four of whom had shown no recent aggression to others). The regression analysis showed that panel number, the variable which reflects the varying theoretical viewpoints of the panel members, was a more significant correlate of decisions to commit or discharge than aggressive behavior in the hospital (r = -.385 for panel number and r = .082 for aggression in the hospital, table 6). Panel I, with. the psychiatrist who favored a sociological view of mental illness, made fewer recommendations to commit than either panel II or panel III.
Both aggression variables correlated significantly with findings of dangerousness. Two of the findings from the correlation analysis (see  table 7 ), however, suggests that aggressive acts committed in the distant past influenced decisions as much as those in the recent past. First, the low correlation between panel recommendation and aggression in the hospital, divided into distant and recent aggression (r = -.259) indicates that recent acts did not contribute more than distant acts to decisions to commit. Second, the presence or absence of aggression at commitment accounted for more of the variance in findings of dangerousness than aggression in the hospital. When aggression was reported in conjunction with commitment proceedings, there was a tendency for panel members to use dangerousness as a reason for continued commitment. The zero correlation between hospital and commitment aggression (r = -.070) shows that patients who were aggressive at the time of the commitment were not necessarily aggressive 
Summary and Conclusions
Three panels evaluated the dangerousness of patients committed by the court to a State mental hospital to determine whether their involuntary hospitalization was legal under the Supreme Court's Donaldson ruling. As described by the project directors in their final report, the psychiatrists of each panel held viewpoints about mental illness and dangerousness that differed from the law students' and from each others'. In order to analyze how findings of dangerousness were made and to determine whether differences in the recommendations among the panels were due to the differing viewpoints about dangerousness of those making the evaluations, or to differences in the patients' behavior, a regression analysis was performed in which panel recommendations and criteria used for recommending continued commitment were dependent variables and panel number, aggression in the hospital, and aggression at commitment were independent variables. As predicted, it was found that recommendations to commit or discharge were related V0L5.N0.2.1979 217 more to the viewpoints of the psychiatrist of each panel than to the patients' past behavior. It was also found that distant acts of aggression and aggression mentioned as a reason for commitment influenced evaluations of dangerousness even in the absence of recent aggressive behavior.
The qualification of psychiatrists as expert witnesses is based on two unjustified assumptions-that it is possible to predict future behavior and that psychiatrists are uniquely qualified to make the predictions. There is considerable theoretical disagreement among mental health professionals regarding dangerous behavior (see Chodorkoff and Baxter [1969] ; Ervin [1969] ; Megargee [1969] for reviews.) Moreover, those studies that have examined the actual incidence of dangerous behavior among those committed for dangerousness show an appallingly low level of reliability; for example, Wenk, Robinson, and Smith (1972) found that only one third of one percent of 1,630 parolees predicted to be dangerous by psychiatrists committed violent crimes after release.
This study suggests that psychiatrists make decisions about dangerousness according to their own social and political predilections rather than on the basis of clinical knowledge. Civil libertarian psychiatrists who subscribe to the notion in criminal law-"when in doubt, release"-will find fewer patients dangerous for commitment purposes than psychiatrists who follow the medical view-"when in doubt, suspect illness." Because the Donaldson Court declined to define dangerousness in terms of acts, and because courts, in commitment hearings, usually respect conclusory opinions about dangerousness by psychiatrists, decisions about commitment and liberty tend to be made on the basis of personal social beliefs rather than by application of law-in short, by individuals, not laws.
The right to liberty is protected in the criminal justice system by the requirement that statutory statements of crime, for commission of which one may lose one's liberty, define forbidden acts with sufficient specificity so that people know what it is they may and may not do. Thus, we take away the liberty of criminals only if they commit certain clearly specified acts. But we are willing to deprive mental patients of liberty on the basis of the hunches of psychiatrists about future, ill-defined behavior. To take discretion away from psychiatrists, it is necessary, at the very least, to draft commitment statutes that define dangerousness in terms of the commission of specific and serious acts in conjunction with flagrant mental states.
